

Message Text

SECRET

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41

ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INR-05 INRE-00 PM-03 NEA-07 L-01

MC-01 /032 W

----- 074719

O 311408Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6520

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 10079

STADIS////////////////////////////////

LIMDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO, NEA ATHERTON AND PM VEST

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: MASS, JO, US

SUBJECT: JORDAN ASSISTANCE

REF: 3388 MAP AMMAN (DTG 31 DEC 1359Z 75)

1. REFTTEL INDICATED CONTINUED JORDANIAN INTEREST IN ADDITIONAL ADVANCED US WEAPONS SYSTEMS . WE PRESUME INTEREST FUELED BY KING'S DESIRE TO HAVE THE BEST, TOGETHER WITH A PRESUMPTION OF ADDITIONAL ARAB SUBSIDIES WITH WHICH TO PURCHASE SUCH WEAPONS. PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE WEAPONS WHICH ARE NOW BEING CONSIDERED, IN ADDITION TO ON GOING F-5 PROGRAMS, ARE COBRA HELICOPTERS WITH TOW MISSILES, AND A MUNITIONS CONTROL (COMMERCIAL) PURCHASE OF HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTERS. IN THE GROUND FORCES, IN ADDITION TO HAWKS/VULCAN, THERE IS AN INTEREST IN ADDITIONAL REDEYE/STINGER WEAPONS, SP ARTILLERY AND TANKS.

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, HAWKS WILL DRAIN AIR FORCE AND ARMY OF A LARGE SEGMENT OF ITS TRAINED MANPOWER. JORDAN ARMED FORCES ARE GIVING THIS PROGRAM HIGHEST PRIORITY. FURTHER AGGRAVATING THE PROBLEM, JAF IS MOVING AHEAD

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WITH TWO NEW AIR BASES, A JET ENGINE INTERMEDIATE

MAINTENANCE FACILITY, A TANK REBUILD FACILITY, AN IN-COUNTRY PILOT TRAINING SCHOOL AND A MISSILE REPAIR FACILITY.

3. AS REFTTEL MAKES CLEAR, BEFORE LONG, WE WILL BE ASKED FORMALLY TO ADDRESS SOME OF THESE ISSUES -- HELICOPTERS, NEW AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS, AND ADDITIONAL GROUND MOBILITY (THE LATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR FY76 AND FY 77 GRANT AND CREDIT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.)

4. WE BELIEVE JORDANIAN WILL HAVE AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM ABSORBING ALL OF THESE WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY SINCE NO MOVE HAS BEEN MADE TO RECONFIGURE COMBAT STRENGTH FROM FIVE TO FOUR DIVISIONS, AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED. FOR REASONS NOTED ABOVE, TRAINED MANPOWER IS STRETCHED. NEW RECRUITING FOR THE ARMED FORCES HAS FALLEN OFF AND CONSCRIPTION IS BEING INTRODUCED TO FILL THE VOID. NO LONGER DO THE ARMED FORCES PLAY A SOCIAL ROLE OF SOPPING UP EXCESS MANPOWER; NOW WITH LOW UNEMPLOYMENT, OUTSIDE SALARIES ARE TOO COMPETITIVE. EVEN TRADITIONAL BEDOUIN SOURCES OF RECRUITMENT CANNOT PRODUCE THE VOLUNTEERS, PARTICULARLY FROM A QUALITY STANDPOINT WHEN TECHNICALLY TRAINABLE MANPOWER IS THE PRIMARY NEED.

5. WE BELIEVE THAT BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER, WE SHOULD ASK THE JORDANIANS TO TAKE THE TIME TO EVALUATE FULLY THEIR PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO ABSORB EQUIPMENT, WEAPONRY, AND FACILITIES PLANNED OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS. TO BE OF VALUE, THIS STUDY WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AND EVALUATED BY USG PRIOR TO THE NEXT JOINT COMMISSION MILITARY COMMITTEE (JMC) MEETING (POSSIBLY MARCH). THEREFORE WE WOULD REQUEST THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

(A) IN THE AIR FORCE, EVALUATE AND UPDATE THEIR THREE YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN PREPARED IN JUNE 1974. PLAN WAS PREPARED AT EMBASSY REQUEST BEFORE WE WOULD RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT. PLAN PROVIDES FOR ABSORPTION OF AIRCRAFT, PILOT AND TECHNICAL TRAINING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT. WE BELIEVE RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT TO DATE UNDER PLAN WOULD

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BE A HELPFUL YARDSTICK IN EVALUATING POTENTIAL TO HANDLE HELICOPTER AND OTHER PROGRAMS. NEW PLAN WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR ABSORBING FOURTEEN I-HAWK BATTERIES AND A SOPHISTICATED AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM, AS WELL AS NEW PLANNED FACILITIES.

(B) IN THE ARMY, WE SHOULD ASK THEM TO PROVIDE A SIMILAR PLAN ALONG WITH AN UPDATE OF THEIR INPUT PROVIDED FOR THE GRANGER REPORT IN APRIL 1973. ANALYSIS

SHOULD COVER ALL GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS ARMY
PECULIAR ITEMS, AND BE EXCLUSIVE OF AIR FORCE REQUIRE-
MENTS TO REDUCE "FUDGE"FACTORS. IN THAT THE 1973
INPUT COVERED EVERY CONCEIVABLE ASPECT OF THEIR ARMED
FORCES, IT EVENTUALLY PROVED TO BE AN INVALUABLE
STATISTICAL BASE, NOT ONLY FOR US BUT FOR JAF AS WELL.
(C) WE WOULD ASK THAT BOTH STUDIES BE COMPLETED
PRIOR TO THE NLT 15 FEBRUARY 1976 ARRIVAL OF A JOINT
STATE/DOD TEAM, ON THE ORDER OF THE GRANGER TEAM, TO
REVIEW THE INPUT AND WORK WITH THE JORDANIANS IN FILLING
THE GAPS AND ELIMINATING THE FUDGE, INCONSISTENCIES, AND OVERSIGHTS,
WE WOULD ENVISION A STAY OF 7-10 DAYS FOR THIS GROUP WHICH WOULD
BE HEAVY ON FORCE DEVELOPMENT TYPES. WHILE THE EMPHASIS
FOR THE GRANGER REPORT WAS MATERIEL, THIS REPORT SHOULD
BE PEOPLE-ORIENTED BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE WE SEE THE
COMING CRUNCH.

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ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INR-05 INRE-00 PM-03 NEA-07 L-01

MC-01 /032 W

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O 311408Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6521

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 10079

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

LIMDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SISCO, NEA ATHERTON AND PM VEST

(D) TEAM WOULD THEN RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO PRODUCE
A CONCISE ANALYTICAL REPORT OF JAF'S CAPABILITY TO
ABSORB ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, WEAPONRY AND FACILITIES
PROGRAMMED AND PLANNED OVER NEXT THREE YEARS. REPORT WOULD BE
READY FOR AND A BASIS OF MARCH JMC MEETING.

(E) WITH THIS REPORT AS A BASIS WE WOULD ALSO BE IN A FAR BETTER POSITION NOT TO MENTION ADVANTAGES TO JORDANIANS OF EVALUATING WHERE THEY ARE GOING IN THE NEXT THREE YEARS. OF COURSE IT WOULD ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MAKING DECISIONS REGARDING WEAPONRY REQUESTED UNDER GRANT FMS AND COMMERCIAL BUY AT JMC. WE BELIEVE IT IS NOW TIME TO SEE A MORE PLANNED PROGRAMMED AND INTEGRATED APPROACH TO WEAPON ACQUISITION THAN HERETOFORE.

6. WE WOULD EXPECT CONSIDERABLE STATIC FROM JORDANIAN MILITARY BECAUSE THEIR STAFFS ARE ALREADY OVER STRETCHED AND LIMITED IN CAPABILITY. NEVERTHELESS SOME OF THE MORE AWARE SENIOR OFFICERS MIGHT WELCOME THE MOVE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO REPORT FACTUALLY TO THE KING THE CONSEQUENCES OF EVER-INCREASING MILITARY ACQUISITIONS. THIS IS AN AREA WHERE THE KING IN HIS APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS COULD
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STAND SOME ADDITIONAL STUDY.

7. TO OVERCOME POTENTIAL RESISTANCE TO THIS SUGGESTION HERE I WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO ADVANCE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS. WE HAVE APPROVED COBRA WITH TOW FOR JORDAN IN PRINCIPLE (MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THIS IS TRUE BUT THAT DID HAVE ASKED JORDAN TO HOLD OFF SEEKING LOA AND DELIVERY FOR A VARIETY OF TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL REASONS.) WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO WORK OUT DELIVERY SCHEDULES, ETC BUT ON THE BASIS OF AN OVERALL PLAN. SIMILARLY WE HAVE APPROVED HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS IN PRINCIPLE BUT AGAIN NEED THE DATE ON THEIR CAPABILITIES BEFORE GOING AHEAD ON NUMBERS DELIVERY SCHEDULES, ETC. WITH REGARD TO GROUND FORCES WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT FOR FY 77 WE ARE THINKING OF NO LESS THAN THE SAME NUMBERS PROPOSED TO CONGRESS FOR FY 76 BUT WITH A LARGER CREDIT AND SMALLER GRANT COMPONENT. WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW IS WHAT THEY WOULD WANT OR WISH TO BUY AND HOW THEY PLAN TO ABSORB IT. THIS WILL BE LESS EASY THAN THE AIR FORCE PROGRAM BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTIES OF THE STATUS OF THE CURRENT (FY 76) FIGURES IN THE CONGRESS.

8. WE ARE PREPARED HERE TO DO THE GROUNDWORK AND ABSORB THE NECESSARY HEAT. AND IF IT GETS TOO HOT THAT WILL LEAVE YOU IN A POSITION TO PULL US BACK, BUT MY FEELING IS THAT THE REQUEST IS WISE AND WELL JUSTIFIED AND (WITH THE APPROVALS ABOVE) CONTAINS SOME ADVANTAGES (DIRE AND INDIRECT) FOR THE JORDANIANS.

9. ACTION REQUESTED: I WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THIS APPROACH IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK (JANUARY 5 AND 6) I WILL NEED APPROVAL FOR THE PROCEDURE AND PARTICULARLY FOR PARA 7. THIS MESSAGE IS BEING SENT STADIS TO GIVE

YO TIME TO REACT ALONE. I HAVE NO OBJECTIONS AND SEE
SOME ADVANTAGE TO IT BEING GIVEN TO AND DISCUSSED
WITH DEFENSE SOON AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL.
PICKERING

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